Slumlords of the Intelligence Age: How the AI Debt Boom Could Go Bust

The State of Drift Part 2: The machines that wear out, the product that melts, and the people left holding the bill.

Jonathan Gordon

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Closeup of a brick wall with a large vertical crack

State of Drift · Part 2 · What the AI debt boom costs the people who own the budget and the codebase

State of Drift is a series about controlling software drift: the errors and omissions that accumulate inside code that appears to work. Drift isn't new. AI didn't create it, but it increases how fast drift accumulates, beyond what any team can review.

Part 1 looked at how AI is changing engineering work from writing code to supervising it. This part looks at the economics: how the AI buildout is financed, why those economics are unstable, and what they mean for companies that use AI to build software.

Here, I address the dual costs of AI: the price paid for it, and the engineering time it takes to make AI-generated code safe to ship. It covers how the AI buildout is financed, which costs don't appear on the vendor's invoice, and the two investments worth making now, before the debt behind the buildout comes due.

Where this started

A friend sent me a podcast: Paul Kedrosky on Big Technology. Kedrosky argues that the AI infrastructure boom will end the way most infrastructure booms end: more capacity gets built than there are paying customers to use it, and the loans that financed it go bad. I listened twice.

It left me with two questions: How far is what AI actually produces from what companies need? And what has to be in place before the debt comes due, so that a crash leaves behind something usable?

I've spent my career assessing the first question in software, where it's called drift: the errors and omissions that cause code to veer from its original intent while still appearing to work. My company builds a tool that measures, tracks, and fixes it. I'm disclosing this so readers can weigh my conclusions accordingly.

How AI vendors describe data centers

Capacity is only worth what its output sells for.

The CEO of the leading AI chipmaker describes a data center as a factory. In his mind, it isn't a cost center full of servers. It produces tokens, and the only number that matters is cost per token. Roughly $3 trillion of planned construction through 2028 has been justified this way, because it presents the largest capital spending program in corporate history as production capacity. But capacity is only worth what its output sells for. That matters to every company buying AI: each dollar of AI spending assumes the price of AI output will hold up. It isn't holding up.

GPU cloud companies and the debt behind them

The debt lasts decades. The machines last five years.

Some builders are also vendors that businesses buy AI capacity from. Alongside the large cloud providers is a newer group, called neoclouds: companies that lease land and power, borrow money using the GPUs as collateral, and rent the computing capacity to customers. In that same podcast, Kedrosky suggests that data centers are "really just multi-tenant apartment buildings; it just so happens there's no humans in the apartment building, there's just GPUs." Hardware loses value quickly. Chips running at full load can fail in as little as 18 months, while accounting schedules assume five or six years. The chipmaker's CEO has said that when the next generation ships, "nobody will want" the previous one. Loans, on the other hand, are written on real-estate timelines, decades longer than the hardware lasts.

A data center full of GPUs doesn't hold its value the way a building does. If its main customer leaves or folds, what remains are outdated chips and a power contract. For a company buying from such an operator, that’s concentration risk. When capacity is tied to a debt-funded operator renting out depreciating hardware, what happens to pricing, service levels, and ability to switch providers when that operator can't refinance its debt? The larger problem is the falling price of what they sell.

AI prices are falling about 80% a year

To keep revenue flat, a seller has to sell 5x the volume every year.

The price of tokens is dropping fast. The flagship model of March 2023 launched at $30 per million tokens. Models with comparable capability now sell for about 14 cents per million: a 200-to-300x decline in three years, with no sign of leveling off.

The math is straightforward. At an 80% annual decline, a dollar's worth of tokens sells for 20 cents after one year, four cents after two, and under a penny after three. Cheaper tokens make new uses affordable, and enterprise AI budgets have grown even as the per-token price fell. To keep revenue flat, however, a seller has to sell five times the volume every year, indefinitely.

Vendors can’t always keep charging more for their models than their competitors. Kedrosky doubts it: "Everyone thinks they can tell the difference between brands, but the reality is no one can."

Who is financing the AI buildout?

As of the second quarter of 2026, the Bank for International Settlements found that more than half of data-center funding is external: loans, bonds, and private credit.

The chipmaker's roughly $500 billion arrangement with six of the world's largest asset managers has been criticized as circular: money connected to the chipmaker helps fund the customers who buy its chips. Critics say the arrangement is structured so that losses fall on ordinary bond investors.

None of this means the technology will fail. A bubble bursts when deployable supply exceeds sellable demand, not when the product stops working. Estimates put that point around 2029, when enough data-center capacity with power connected comes online to show whether real demand can use it.


Line graph showing that builders owe more money than borrowers

From Sept. 14 to Oct. 14, 2026, shares of six debt-funded GPU landlords fell 24% on average, while four self-funded Big Tech builders rose 4%. Source: Stooq.com (2026); author’s calculations.


Capacity is sold out today, which is normal in the middle of a buildout but says nothing about how it ends. Exposure isn't limited to a company's own AI spending. Much of this debt is held through private credit and index funds. If it goes bad, the losses won't stay inside the AI sector. They will reach the broader financial markets through those same funds. So, a company that spends very little on AI can still lose money when the loans behind the buildout default.

Why are they selling it to us?

If this technology is about to be smarter than all of us, why are the companies that build it so eager to rent it out instead of keeping it for themselves? Kedrosky asks it more directly: "If it can eat the whole economy, why not just ingest the economy and stop selling it to us?"

I can see three explanations.

Their lead doesn't last. When prices fall 80% a year, the best model available today loses most of its value within a year. Selling access quickly is how a lab earns revenue from it before that happens.

They need the revenue. The chipmaker bills every quarter, and AI doesn't yet generate enough profit to cover its costs. The labs need customers: their money, their data, and their trust.

Selling is how they learn. This is the most cynical explanation, and it comes from the CEO of a company with a long record of absorbing products built on its own platform. He says business customers are “paying twice:” once in cash, and again in the expertise their questions teach the model. That second cost rarely appears in anyone's accounting. What a customer teaches the vendor is part of what it pays.

Whichever explanation is right, pay attention to what the labs stop selling, and when. If the best model is ever withheld from customers and kept for the lab’s own use, that will be the point at which the lab believes it can do the work of the companies it's currently selling to. Those companies then stop being customers and become competitors, using an older model than the one competing against them and trained in part on what they taught it.

Why AI output isn't production-ready

The models are probabilistic. Production software is not. The difference can be measured.

The AI buildout depends on one assumption: that AI can reliably build and run production software. The models can't do that yet. They are probabilistic, and the systems they're meant to run are not. Enterprise software depends on determinism—the same input always returns the same output. The models fail that test even at temperature zero—identical prompts, different outputs.

Errors also compound. A step that succeeds 95% of the time, repeated 20 times in a row, succeeds about 36% of the time overall, which helps explain why roughly 95% of enterprise AI pilots never reach production. I wrote about this problem for Stack Overflow where I called it black box AI drift, before I had measurements. Now I have them.

This is where the engineering manager's problem and the CFO's problem are the same. “Cost per token” measures what a company pays for the model's output. Nobody measures cost per usable token: what a company pays for the output plus the engineering time needed to make it safe to ship. That engineering time is paid in salaries, which don't fall like token prices. On our drift scale, fixing AI-generated code takes 0.75 to 2.5 engineer-hours per file.

The more serious problem isn't incorrect code. It's missing code: the empty-state screen no one built, the authorization check that only ran in the browser. Missing pieces don't show up in a demo; they show up when real users use the software at scale. Weighted by the cost to fix them, the cost grows. Our research found that security flaws appeared three times as often in AI-generated code as in human-written code and cost 22 times as much to fix.

The variation doesn't come from the model, either. We ran the same model through five different coding tools on the same 42 prompts and got five different patterns of drift. The tooling around the model determined the result, not the model's capability, which means better models won't solve this on their own.

AI produces code faster than teams can check it. About a third of pull requests now merge with no review; not because of policy, but because reviewers can't keep up. In September, a widely shared post from a major AI coding community described engineers working 12-hour days "just to press enter." There’s now a term for that role: meat proxy. In an organization that works this way, morale is a problem that motivation can’t fix. It's drift, and the organization is paying for it in staff.

The reasonable objection is that humans make mistakes too. The global economy still runs on human work, using double-entry bookkeeping and maker-checker controls to catch errors. That's correct, and it points to the solution: a probabilistic model working inside deterministic checks, where the model proposes a change and fixed, repeatable rules approve or reject it. When output is cheap to verify, the model's variability becomes useful, which is why software development is the strongest market for AI so far. Where verification is expensive, however, those checks mostly don't exist yet, and that limits everything described above. The ability to absorb the capacity arriving around 2029 depends on doing that verification work.

Why AGI doesn't change the debt schedule

A payoff in 2035 doesn't repay a loan due in 2029.

One argument is supposed to make every number above irrelevant: AGI is coming, and it will be worth any price. Kedrosky frames it in investment terms. What would you pay for a call option on AGI? "Like saying, ‘what would you spend for a call option on immortality?’ Mathematically, I should be willing to spend anything." Its supporters mean this literally: a century of scientific progress in a decade, human lifespans doubling. Compared to that, token prices seem unimportant.

The argument fails for practical reasons. Spending more only helps if it increases the chance of the payoff. Another data center adds computing capacity; it doesn’t guarantee AGI. No one knows which lab will get there, with which approach, or in which decade. In past infrastructure booms, the eventual gains went to whoever used the resulting capacity, not to the investors who paid for it. Even the CEO most associated with the compressed-century prediction is cautious. He warned in February that "if I'm just off by a year in that rate of growth, you go bankrupt."

The largest investors present the AGI case to their own investors, then value these projects like real estate in their internal meetings. AGI may arrive, but a payoff in 2035 doesn't repay debt due in 2029, and no company should bet itself on that gap. The schedule to plan around is the one that can actually be seen.

What the bond market is signaling

Bond investors are already separating AI companies by how much they owe.

Most of the buildout is borrowed, and those loans now make up what Kedrovsky calls "the largest piece of the high-yield bond market." If they default, the losses won't stay with the companies that borrowed. They will spread to insurers, pension funds, and the index funds in people's retirement accounts, "whether you like it or not."

His warning has held up. Bloomberg reported that bonds of one of the largest GPU cloud companies have fallen to around 80 cents on the dollar, a price that means the market doubts the debt will be repaid in full. At the same time, the company reported a backlog of orders in the hundreds of billions, and its CEO called the sell-off irrational. A backlog is a set of promised future orders. Bond prices reflect what investors will actually pay today. When the two disagree, the bond price is the better guide.

It wasn't just one company. From Sept. 14 to Oct. 14, 2026, shares of six debt-funded GPU cloud companies fell 24% on average, while four large tech companies funding AI from their own cash rose 4% (Stooq daily closing prices; author's calculations). Investors were already doing what this piece recommends: separating the field by how much each company owes.

[ CHART: Borrowers vs. builders, one month of share-price changes ]

Companies whose computing capacity comes from the borrowers are carrying a risk the market has already started to price.

What determines how a crash ends

A crash is survivable. Losses nobody can measure are not.

Back to the second question: what has to be in place for a crash to leave behind something usable? Past infrastructure busts have ended in one of two ways. The dot-com crash wiped out investors, but the fiber-optic cable they paid for stayed in the ground and was still carrying internet traffic 20 years later. The 1890s railroad bust sent companies into bankruptcy, but the rail lines kept operating for another century. In both cases, investors lost their money, but the physical capacity survived.

Two things make that outcome less likely this time. First, hardware loses value fast: a GPU is outdated within about five years, so every year it spends tied up in a bankruptcy reduces its value. Second, losses are hard to see because the debt is spread across private credit funds and off-balance-sheet entities, then resold to insurers and index funds. When no one can measure losses, lenders stop lending, and a crash in one sector becomes a credit freeze across the economy.

The costs are already arriving. While writing this, I saw a Reddit post from an engineer in Scotland whose employer, a server-parts maker in business for 30 years, was shutting down. AI hadn't replaced his job; data centers had bought all the memory chips his company's customers needed. Replies described a translator correcting machine translations for a penny a word and a researcher who couldn't get computing time because the AI buildout had already bought it. These costs come early, and they fall on people with no part in the financing decisions. What those posts say, without saying so directly, is what this piece argues for: someone has to be paid to find and fix the problems with what AI produces. The review and repair work are where new jobs will come from, and it’s also why companies should keep experienced engineers on staff.

There are two parts to preparing for what comes after. The first is deterministic verification: tooling that allows the model to propose a change, as well as fixed rules to approve or reject it, with cost-per-usable-token, not cost-per-token. A crash would make tokens almost free, and verification is what makes almost-free tokens usable.

The second part is making computing capacity a standardized commodity with standard contracts, published benchmarks, and working resale markets, so a failed operator's hardware can be sold to new owners in months instead of losing value while it sits unused, and making the financing public, because losses that can be measured can be absorbed. None of this is exciting. It decides whether a crash ends like 2001, with usable capacity left over, or like 2008, with a credit freeze.

This is State of Drift, Part 2. The series will continue to track the economics, the verification tooling, the resale market for hardware, and the growing difference between what AI produces and what production software requires.

FAQs

What is software drift?

Software drift is the accumulation of errors and omissions in code that still appears to work. It isn't new, but AI speeds it up because code gets written and shipped faster than anyone can check it. The mistakes usually show up only when real users depend on the software.

How could the AI bubble burst?

The most likely ending is oversupply: more data-center capacity than paying customers. AI doesn't have to fail for that to happen. Because AI prices fall about 80% a year and the chips wear out in a few years, it only takes one year in which revenue grows more slowly than prices fall, while the debt is still due.

Who is financing the AI data center buildout?

Mostly borrowed money. The Bank for International Settlements found that by mid-2026, more than half the money going into data centers came from external financing: loans, bonds, and private credit. If those loans default, the losses can spread to insurers, pension funds, and index funds held in ordinary retirement accounts.

Why does the lifespan of AI chips matter?

AI data-center loans are written on long timelines, and the accounting assumes chips last five or six years. Chips running continuously can fail much sooner, and each new generation makes the previous one less valuable. Unlike fiber-optic cable after the dot-com crash, worn-out chips can't sit unused for years and still be worth buying.

What would a soft landing for the AI boom look like?

Two things would limit the damage. The first is verification: tools that check AI's work, produce consistent results, and catch errors before they ship. The second is financial transparency: visible debts, a working resale market for chips, and losses that can be measured before they spread.

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JONATHAN GORDON is the Founder & CEO of ReWeaver AI. With nearly three decades of experience, he has shaped developer tools and enterprise software at Google, Apple, Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP. He holds two patents and specializes in human-centered design for complex systems, AI/ML integration, and developer tooling.

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Not investment advice.